Four Years of Closed Skies

By Oleh Zakorchemnyi
Chief Executive Officer, Kyiv International Airport
Aviation and Critical Infrastructure Analyst

The return of aviation is not a calendar date

Discussions about reopening Ukrainian airspace are often reduced to timelines, political decisions, or security guarantees. Far less attention is paid to a factor that is no less critical: the people who must ensure safe operations once flights resume.

After nearly four years of suspended civil aviation, the primary challenge is not infrastructure in the narrow sense — runways, terminals, or navigation systems — but the operational readiness of airport personnel. Aviation is a high-risk system where safety depends not on intentions, but on competence, routine, and disciplined execution.

Aviation safety begins with people, not equipment

In civil aviation, safety is only as strong as its weakest link. In practice, that link is rarely technology — it is human performance.

A prolonged operational pause inevitably leads to:

• erosion of operational routines;
• disruption of continuous training cycles;
• loss of experienced staff to other sectors or countries;
• degradation of procedural “muscle memory” in safety-critical tasks.

This is not a failure of management or individuals. It is a predictable consequence of any extended shutdown in a complex system.

Which airport functions require priority retraining

Workforce recovery cannot be generic or simultaneous. Different airport functions carry different risk profiles.

The most sensitive areas include:

• airside operations and apron services;
• aviation security (AVSEC);
• airport rescue and firefighting services;
• engineering and technical maintenance units;
• ground handling operations.

In these domains, even minor deviations from standard procedures may have disproportionate safety implications.

Post-shutdown training is not standard refresher training

One of the most dangerous misconceptions is that recertification or short refresher courses are sufficient. After a four-year operational hiatus, traditional recurrent training is inadequate.

What is required instead is structured recovery training focused on:

• rebuilding operational habits;
• intensive scenario-based simulations;
• cross-departmental coordination exercises;
• restoring a safety culture, not merely procedural compliance.

This is a gradual process. It cannot be compressed into weeks without introducing systemic risk.

Human factors as the primary restart risk

International aviation experience consistently shows that human factors account for the majority of incidents during early phases of operational recovery.

For this reason, ICAO and EASA place particular emphasis on:

• Crew Resource Management (CRM);
• Safety Management Systems (SMS);
• simulator-based training;
• structured readiness audits.

In Ukraine’s case, these requirements are compounded by prolonged stress exposure, fatigue, and the psychological burden carried by aviation professionals during wartime.

Psychological readiness: an underestimated dimension

Returning to aviation operations after war is not purely a technical challenge. It is a psychological transition back to constant vigilance, accountability, and decision-making under pressure.

Ignoring this dimension creates latent risks that no regulatory framework can fully mitigate. Psychological resilience must be treated as part of operational readiness, not as an afterthought.

A realistic approach: phased operational recovery

Airspace reopening is not a single event. It is a controlled process that must include:

• internal workforce readiness assessments;
• limited and supervised trial operations;
• gradual traffic ramp-up;
• continuous monitoring and corrective feedback.

This phased approach is the only credible way to restore operations without compromising safety.

What must be avoided

The most dangerous decision is to simulate readiness.

Civil aviation does not tolerate symbolic compliance or political haste. Safety systems either function — or they fail.

Opening later, but safely, is always preferable to opening earlier with embedded systemic vulnerabilities.

Conclusion

The return of civil aviation is, above all, the return of people to responsibility, discipline, and operational rhythm forged over years. Infrastructure can be restored relatively quickly. Trust in safety systems takes far longer to rebuild.

That is why workforce training and preparedness are not auxiliary elements of aviation recovery — they are its foundation.